



## **Transcript of Hearing**

**Date:** November 8, 2019 **Case:** Depp, II -v- Heard

**Planet Depos** 

Phone: 888.433.3767

Email:: transcripts@planetdepos.com

www.planetdepos.com

WORLDWIDE COURT REPORTING & LITIGATION TECHNOLOGY

1	APPEARANCES (cont.)
2	ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANT:
3	
4 5 6	JOSHUA TREECE, ESQUIRE WOODS ROGERS, PLC 10 South Jefferson Street Suite 1400 Roanoke, Virginia 24011-1319 (540) 983-7600
8	
9 10 11 12	JOHN C. QUINN, ESQUIRE KAPLAN HECKER & FINK, LLP 350 Fifth Avenue Suite 7110 New York, New York 10118 (212) 763-0884
13	ON BEHALF OF THE VIRGINIA PRESS ASSOCIATION:
14	
15 16 17 18	JENNIFER A. NELSON, ESQUIRE RCFP 1156 15TH Street, Northwest Suite 1020 Washington, D.C. 20005 (202) 795-9312
19	
20	
21	
22	

1	PROCEEDINGS
2	(Court reporter duly sworn by the Court.)
3	THE COURT: Could I get everybody to note
4	their appearances on the record for us, please, and
5	we'll include those with regard to the amicus brief
6	issue as well.
7	MR. CHEW: Good morning, Your Honor. May
8	it please the court. Ben Chew for plaintiff Johnny
9	Depp. With me here today is co-counsel Rob Gilmore.
10	THE COURT: Good morning.
11	MR. TREECE: Good morning, Your Honor.
12	Joshua Treece on behalf defendant Amber Heard. And
13	with me is John Quinn from Kaplan Hecker & Fink ham
14	on behalf of Ms. Heard.
15	THE COURT: Good morning.
16	MS. NELSON: Good morning, Your Honor.
17	Jennifer Nelson on behalf of the Virginia Press
18	Association.
19	THE COURT: Good morning.
20	All right. Well, why don't we start with
21	the first motion with the first motion we'll get
22	to the other one in time that would be the motion

with regard to the leave to file amended responsive
pleading.

MR. TREECE: Thank you, Your Honor.

As Your Honor is well aware, we're here today on defendant's motion for leave to file an amended responsive pleadings, specifically an amended plea in bar and demurrer. And we have an accompanying request to file the oversized brief that is attached to our motion in amended responsive pleadings.

I'd like to take a quick minute to set the procedural stage for the court. Ms. Heard's initial responsive pleadings were due on May 20th, 2019. In her initial responsive pleadings she filed a plea in bar and she filed a motion to dismiss. The motion to dismiss was essentially a motion to transfer. This court ruled on the motion to dismiss on August 8th, 2019 disposing of the motion to transfer. And, Your Honor, less than a month after the court ruled on that dispositive motion, the motion to transfer, motion to dismiss, less than a month on September 5th, we filed our motion for

1 leave. We did it quickly. We did it diligently. 2 And I will tell the court, as you may be 3 aware, new counsel were added to the case after the motion to dismiss hearing. And immediately upon 4 5 being added to the case, we filed the motion for 6 leave to amend our responsive pleadings. Less than 7 a month from the court's ruling, is not a long time, 8 as Your Honor us well aware, parties at least have 9 21 days to answer after dispositive pleadings are 10 dismissed if it's a demurrer or something along 11 those lines. We, of course, still had an active 12 plea in this case, so no answer is due. 13 Immediately upon becoming involved in the 14 case, Your Honor, I had a couple of calls with 15 Mr. Chew. In those first calls, I told Mr. Chew we 16 are going to be moving to file amended responsive 17 pleadings. He didn't note an objection to that 18 until September 13th. So we told them at the outset 19 that we were doing this. We have moved diligently 20 to set it for a hearing, Your Honor. 21 As you may remember, we had the 22 protective order hearing scheduled. The next

available date was October 11th. We moved to set this hearing for October 11th. There were some scheduling issues that occurred later, which necessitated us putting a motion to compel in the place of this motion. But since it's been filed, we have moved quickly, we have moved swiftly to have this heard, and we're now here today on that issue.

The other point, Your Honor, Ms. Heard is not in default. Again, she has an active pleading and she's not previously moved to amend her pleadings. The motion before this court, as you well know, is routine, is routinely granted, and it should be granted here.

The Virginia Supreme Court rules set a liberal standard for amended pleadings. The rules say, Rule 1:8 says, "Leave to amend shall be liberally granted in the furtherance of the ends of justice." As you've seen in our motion, we note that the Supreme Court has repeatedly reversed lower courts that deny leave to amend when there is no prejudice to the opposing party. So the real issue Your Honor is, is there any prejudice? As a matter

of law, there is and can be no prejudice here.

The first point on that, Your Honor, is we could file a motion for summary judgment today on the exact same issues. We don't want to do that because we don't want to have multiple motions for summary judgment and we already have a motion to file the demurrer. But we could do that today. There is zero prejudice to Johnny Depp by having this heard on a demurrer when we can raise the exact same deficiencies in his pleading on a motion for summary judgment. Secondly, Your Honor, judicial economy and economic efficiency support the having -- granting a motion for leave and having the demurrer heard.

If Your Honor agrees with us that the statements at issue are merely subjective opinions, they don't reference Johnny Depp, they were made more than two years ago, to the extent they reference any specific statement, they reference a statement that was made in a declaration submitted to a court in connection with a temporary restraining order, which is judicially immune from

1	liability. If the court agrees with us on those
2	things, the case may be gone. If the court takes
3	issue with some of the statements and says some of
4	them can proceed and some of them can't, that
5	nonetheless has the effect of trimming the case,
6	trimming the issues for trial, and trimming the
7	issues for discovery. It is inefficient to wait to
8	have these issues heard. We have been moving
9	quickly. We would like to have this heard.
10	We tried to set the hearing on this
11	matter for the 22nd. We worked with opposing
12	counsel to try to achieve that. That date did not
13	work for them. So now we have agreed to December
14	20th. We've agreed to a briefing schedule that they
15	requested. Since we filed this, they had our brief,
16	they had our arguments, they know the landscape.
17	The court knows the landscape from the attachments.
18	The other point, Your Honor, is we've got
19	the active plea in bar. And the active plea in bar
20	is on immunity under the anti-SLAPP statute. The
21	arguments on that plea in bar are going to deal with
22	the very same issues, in some respects, that are

presented on demurrer. Are these actionable
statements of provable fact? Are they merely
subjective opinion? When Ms. Heard said, I became a
public figure representing domestic abuse, is that,
as it appears to be, a clear subjective statement of
her view of her standing in the community,
independent of any underlying facts? She says she
is a public representative, became a public figure
representing domestic abuse, whether that is
independent of underlying facts, Your Honor. I
mean, if the public views her in that way, she is a
public figure representing domestic abuse.

I don't want to devolve into that too much at this point, Your Honor. I simply want to point out that the plea in bar that we're going to have heard anyway is going to deal with these issues. They can be more tightly addressed on a demurrer to determine whether they're actionable statements in the first instance. That could potentially avoid an evidentiary hearing in a plea in bar. So it is a much more efficient way to address the issue. There's no reason to call our

demurrer a motion for summary judgment. We could,
if the court would like us to, but it doesn't change
the facts.

The other point, Your Honor, is we are at the early stages of this case. You don't have to take my word for it. I would like to quote you their expert disclosures, which we'll deal with separately, but I would like to quote their expert disclosures that were filed this Monday.

"This case is in the preliminary state of discovery. In particular, the parties have barely begun their document production. Nonparties have yet to make significant document productions. And no depositions have been taken."

That is their summary of the state of the case. This is a prime time for a demurrer, Your Honor. It is appropriate. There is zero prejudice. And it's inconceivable that Mr. Depp could suffer any prejudice. He would benefit just like the court would benefit from resolving matters that are not actionable as soon as possible, so that those matters don't remain in front of the parties and the

1	court for discovery, for trial, and for all those
2	other issues.
3	Now, Your Honor, I would like to briefly
4	address arguments they raised in their opposition.
5	One of the arguments they make is, well, you're
6	barred from bringing a demurrer now because there is
7	this notice of scheduling conference that says that
8	demurrers, pleas in bar, and the like need to be
9	resolved before the scheduling conference. Several
10	points on that, Your Honor.
11	THE COURT: You don't need to waste your
12	time on that.
13	MR. TREECE: Thank you.
14	THE COURT: We hope that that's done,
15	I've never found that there was any ability to
16	dismiss somebody's case because they didn't get
17	those things done before the scheduling conference.
18	MR. TREECE: Thank you, Your Honor.
19	THE COURT: We'd love to have it done.
20	It's more aspirational, I guess.
21	MR. TREECE: I understand and we

Now, on their futility arguments, I've
kind of delved into this a little bit, but they
allege four distinct statements that they take issue
with. An op-ed that is clearly public commentary
about the need for social reform, the need for legal
reform. They take four statements out of that, try
to match those four statements together, and then
try to argue that this creates some implication
that's really unspecified. You've got to plead
defamation in (inaudible), as Your Honor is well
aware. They trying to check that box by saying,
well, we quoted the specific language from the
op-ed, but then what they're trying to do is
bootstrap that to say, well, there's this
implication that refers to statements made in 2016,
you know, one year outside the statute of
limitations, so it's time-barred. And they're
trying to say that it refers to some statements in
there, but they don't quote what those are, and
there's no reasonable inference that those could be
imported.

Your Honor is well aware, and this is

L	really more the substantive demurrer that I think
2	they're trying to bring into this argument when it's
3	not necessary, because we're on a motion for leave.
4	But, nonetheless, to address futility, what they're
5	trying to do is take the narrow doctrine of
6	defamation by implication, broaden that doctrine and
7	essentially break the doctrine.
3	The bottom line is the Supreme Court has
9	said an allegation and defamation by implication has
LO	to be based on the words actually used. And if you
L1	look at the words actually used here, Your Honor,
L2	there's no reference to Johnny Depp. There's no way
L3	it refers to any specific statement. There's no
L 4	conceivable way it is a republication. The law on
L 5	that is clear, Your Honor. We've cited that law.
L 6	We're looking to do a reply brief. We'll elaborate
L7	further on that issue on reply.
L8	But the bottom line is our arguments are

20

not futile. These are serious legal issues that

deserve the court's consideration, deserves the

1	later, to save the court's time, to save the
2	parties' time, to save the court's money, to save
3	the parties' money.
4	And with that, Your Honor, I will save
5	additional points for rebuttal.
6	THE COURT: All right.
7	MR. CHEW: Good morning, again, Your
8	Honor. May it please the court. Ben Chew for
9	Johnny Depp.
10	THE COURT: Good morning.
11	MR. CHEW: Before addressing Mr. Treece's
12	arguments, I just wanted to clarify a point that
13	came up in the last hearing. My co-counsel, in
14	response to Your Honor's question, may have appeared
15	to suggest that the allegations in paragraph 23 of
16	the complaint were made for purposes of the press.
17	THE COURT: I don't think he sort of did
18	it. He completely did it, didn't he?
19	MR. CHEW: Well, that, that was an
20	inadvertent misstatement. The complaint, as Your
21	Honor knows, was filed on March 1 of 2019. My
22	co-counsel was not part of the team at that point.

1	His partner, Ms. Biles, worked with me.
2	Mr. Weingarten, Mr. Waltman, who's another
3	co-counsel, and Mr. Depp in drafting the complaint.
4	Co-counsel did not join the team until May 20th.
5	And he's been an outstanding addition to the team,
6	but he inadvertently misspoke. I probably should
7	have corrected it at the time, but I didn't want to
8	interrupt the flow, but I wanted to make it clear to
9	the court, having been an officer of the court for
10	31 years, I don't include allegations in pleadings
11	for reasons other than they are related to the case.
12	This, as Mr. Treece pointed out, is a
13	defamation case. And though it's not subject to the
14	same pleading standards as fraud, it must be pled
15	with specificity. We had all the language, et
16	cetera. So that's why it was included for purposes
17	of the case.
18	Now, to address
19	THE COURT: Thank you.
20	
20	MR. CHEW: Thank you, Your Honor.
21	MR. CHEW: Thank you, Your Honor. To address Mr. Treece's point, trial is

1	depositions that must be taken between Thanksgiving
2	and Christmas. We're already doubling up scheduling
3	of those depositions. And that's an awful lot of
4	work to do. We still don't have Ms. Heard's answer.
5	I understand that Ms. Heard is able to switch out
6	counsel if she wishes, but that really should not be
7	made to be Mr. Depp's problem. So we would
8	respectfully submit there would be unfair prejudice
9	in this case. We do know that some of their
10	affirmative defenses are this notion that Ms. Heard
11	is not liable somehow because the ACLU may have
12	drafted the title of her op-ed and that somehow, if
13	true, would absolve her of responsibility. We don't
14	know what the basis of that would be. We've asked
15	the VPA for some guidance on that and they weren't
16	at liberty to share with us of whether that had any
17	basis at all. It's not something Ms. Heard had
18	mentioned in any of her prior declarations to this
19	court.
20	Going to futility, Your Honor, the main
21	thrust of the demurrer appears to be that this op-ed
22	did not refer to Johnny Depp, which is risibles. We

have interviews with Ms. Heard, which make very

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

19

20

21

22

clear who she was speaking with. She wasn't talking about her female partner, who she abused. she was speaking with -- speaking about her client. It was very clear to Disney, who fired him two days later from one of the most lucrative franchises in movie history, Pirates of the Caribbean. It wasn't because it wasn't a successful franchise. But, Your Honor, you know, obviously, it's within the court's 10 discretion. We would ask the court to exercise its 11 discretion and not allow the amendment. 1.2 To the extent the court does, we have had 13 a conditional schedule, because we didn't know how 14 this motion would come out. If the court is 15 inclined to grant the motion for leave, which we 16 oppose, we have a proposed schedule that would get 17 it drafted and heard by December 20th, which would 18 be at the very end of the discovery period.

I will reserve time with respect to the VPA motion, which is a separate issue. Thank you, Your Honor.

> Okay, thank you. THE COURT:

1	You wanted to respond, apparently?
2	MR. TREECE: Yes, Your Honor. Thank you.
3	So the first point, with respect to their
4	allegation of prejudice from discovery, we have no
5	intention of pausing discovery or doing anything
6	along those lines. We're working diligently on that
7	front. We continue to work diligently on that front
8	and we still will with a demurrer, plea in bar. The
9	plea in bar is already pending, so that would not
10	pause discovery, nor would a demurrer, but if the
11	demurrer is ruled on and trims the case or
12	eliminates the case, obviously, that's in everyone's
13	interest to know where the court is going to go on
14	those issues.
15	With respect to, just to briefly mention,
16	with respect to title of the article, that was
17	written by the editors of the Washington Post. In
18	paragraph 7 of Ms. Heard's declaration that's been
19	submitted to this court, she attests to that, so
20	that issue is going to be resolved.
21	They do mention damages. And he
22	referenced issues with damages. We've been trying

1	to get information from them on damages and had
2	issues doing so. I think we'll be dealing with that
3	in the near future. But the bottom line, Your
4	Honor, is there is no prejudice. They've got to
5	deal with the plea in bar. Answer is not going to
6	be due anyway, because we have an active plea in
7	bar. Having a demurrer heard first is a more
8	efficient way to resolve many of those issues. We
9	would ask the court to grant leave. Thank you, Your
10	Honor.
11	THE COURT: Leave to amend is to be
12	liberally granted. I grant the leave in this case.
13	I have no objection and actually appreciate that you
14	all have already anticipated that might happen and
15	worked on the scheduling.
16	So I guess the remaining question for us
17	is whether or not there should be a need for an
18	amicus brief.
19	MS. NELSON: Good morning, Your Honor.
20	Jennifer Nelson on behalf of the Virginia Press
21	Association.
22	THE COURT: Good morning.

MS. NELSON: Good morning.

2.0

Your Honor, this is a high profile case, featuring two California residents who are currently litigating a defamation by implication case here in the Commonwealth. And as plaintiff concedes in his opposition, this court may, in its discretion, accept third-party amicus briefs. And it should exercise that discretion here. This brief is both timely and will assist the court at the demurrer stage.

Your Honor, this case presents important questions of law surrounding defamation by implication that are of significant importance to the press members of the Virginia Press Association, its 225 members. And the VPA often provides amicus support in cases such as this one, defamation matters, and has done so in cases over the course of more than three decades.

And with all due respect to the parties, these free press considerations are not being adequately represented by the parties in this action. The VPA and its members will have to

1 operate under the parameters --2 THE COURT: So let me make sure I 3 understand your position. 4 MS. NELSON: Yes. THE COURT: Your position is that the 6 attorneys in this case are adequately representing their clients' interests, but they're not adequately 7 representing your interests; is that your position? 8 9 MS. NELSON: Yes, yes, Your Honor. think that there are free press considerations. 10 11 when this case is over, the Virginia Press will have 12 to operate under the parameters of the ultimate decision by this court. And I think there are 13 1.4 important considerations. As Your Honor knows, the 15 court is an important gatekeeper in determining whether or not statements are actionable as a matter 16 17 If there is significant interest in the of law. press having early disposition of matters like this, 18 19 rather than have them go on and on, and go to a jury, and go up to the Supreme Court of Virginia. 20 21 In fact, the Supreme Court of Virginia, just this 22 past June in a case, specifically reminded the trial

3 ·

court of the importance of evaluating, at the earliest stages of litigation, whether or not statements are actionable as a matter of law, and reminding the trial court that by allowing a case to go to a jury and to go all the way up on appeal, you are wasting party resources, you're wasting the jury's resources, and the court's resources.

And so, Your Honor, I would set forth that the VPA's proposed amicus brief will set forth some of these considerations and some of the chilling effects that can occur by prolonged litigation on defamation cases, where the underlying statements at issue are not actionable as a matter of law.

And, Your Honor, plaintiff, in his opposition, argues that VPA has done no due diligence on the case, but, as Your Honor is well aware, the demurrer is focused on the four corners of the complaint and that is the due diligence that VPA has undertaken in seeking to put forth an amicus brief in this case. Your Honor, whether those statements at issue are reasonably capable of

carrying defamatory meaning, it's important to decide at the early stages of the case.

And, Your Honor, I would argue that this motion for leave is timely. There are no circuit court rules on amicus briefs, but looking to the Supreme Court of Virginia, Rule 5:30, states that an amicus brief is timely if it's filed on the date on which the brief of the party supported is required to be filed. Given that Your Honor has granted the motion for leave by defendant and will accept for filing, presumably today, the amended demurrer, if the VPA submits its amicus brief today, which it is in a position to do, it would be timely under the Supreme Court of Virginia rules.

In arguing that VPA's proposed brief is untimely, plaintiff refers to three district court cases, none of which are applicable here. Two of them are District of Maryland cases, in which a motion for leave to submit an amicus brief was filed long after the briefing at issue was fully briefed and ripe before the court. In the third case, a District of South Carolina case, the court — the

United States had moved to file as amicus or in the 1 2 alternative to join as a plaintiff. The court denied the motion for leave to file as an amicus 3 4 because it granted the United States' motion to join 5 as a plaintiff. So, again, that case is inapposite. 6 I will also briefly mention, Mr. Chew 7 mentioned, his questions regarding the VPA and its knowledge of the ACLU and whether or not it had 8 9 written a portion of the op-ed in question, I will 10 just say for the court, the VPA has no affiliation with the ACLU and want to clear up any confusion on 11 12 that matter, and has no knowledge about ACLU's 13 involvement in the op-ed at issue. So in the interest of brevity, I will just ask the court to 14 15 accept the amicus brief. 16 THE COURT: Okay. 17 MR. CHEW: Very briefly, Your Honor. 18 proffer that Ms. Nelson gave in her motion was to address two issues. One, whether Ms. Heard's 19 20 statements in the op-ed were legally actionable. That's in her motion at paragraphs 15 and 16. 21 22 two, she wants -- the VPA wishes to address

1	anti-SLAPP. And that's in paragraph 17. So those
2	are the two topics that the VPA seeks to address.
3	These topics are already addressed in
4	Ms. Heard's proposed, and now filed, deemed filed,
5.	17-page oversized brief. There is nothing that the
6	VPA seeks to address that hasn't already been
7	addressed by Ms. Heard's counsel. And not to
8	belabor the fact, but Ms. Heard has four active law
9	firms and 11 attorneys of record in this case. One,
10	Ms. Kaplan, told the court that she is one of the
11	top First Amendment lawyers in the country. Have no
12	reason to doubt that. But these topics are already
13	addressed in the 17-page oversized brief. They will
14	be addressed, if the court accepts our proposed
15	briefing schedule, also in a 5-page reply brief. So
16	there's nothing that the VPA would address that's
17	not already encompassed by very well-represented
18	counsel for Ms. Heard.
19	So it would be redundant it. It does
20	come late. We filed this complaint on March 1st. I
21	understand defendant changed counsel and rearranged
22	the deck chairs, but there was nothing to stop the

VPA, within a timely period of time, to notice its amicus. But the point, the main point is, Your Honor, everything she proposes to address, and I'm sure it will be very good, is already encompassed in what defendant has done. There is no purpose for this.

1

2

3

4

5

6

8

9

10

11

12

1.3

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

And it would be prejudicial. already having to file an oversized response, proposed 22 pages, then they get the 5 pages, so we have an even 22 pages. But if the court grants leave, then we would be obligated or we would be obligated to request that Your Honor gives us leave to write a 10-page opposition. So now Mr. Depp, on a second round of dispositive motion pleadings, is going to have to divert resources -- and our team is not as large -- from depositions from Thanksqiving to Christmas, to coming up with 32 pages of opposition briefs. Do we have to use that? No, but we're going to have to respond. And I think that is unfair. I think Ms. Heard is already amply She gets the benefit of the liberal represented. construction, but it really would be piling on for

1 the VPA to be allowed to add another ten pages of 2 briefing the court has to read, we have to respond 3 to, then we would ask the court if the court is 4 going to grant leave for 10 pages to respond. 5 is not fair. That is not efficient. And it is not 6 necessary, because Mr. Treece and his counsel 7 already are addressing those issues. Thank you, Your Honor. 8 9 THE COURT: Do you all want to be heard 10 on this issue? 11 And I will let you come back in a minute. 12 MR. TREECE: I would just briefly say, 13 Your Honor, we have different interests, as you've 14 heard, from the Virginia Press Association. 15 are dealing with the specific issues, the specific 16 statements at issue. They are dealing with broader 17 ramifications on the impact on their industry at 18 They represent, I think, 200-and-some-odd 19 papers and publications. They have, you know, 20 varying interests than the individuals in this case 21 do, for purposes of demonstrating that Ms. Heard is 22 not liable for a \$50 million lawsuit. That is our

1	focus.
2	THE COURT: Do you feel that you've done
3	an inadequate job of
4	MR. TREECE: Certainly not.
5	THE COURT: presentation or briefing?
6	MR. TREECE: Certainly not, Your Honor,
7	but I do think the interests are not entirely
8	aligned. We do not represent
9	THE COURT: Do you present them to be
10	involved in this case for your client?
11	MR. TREECE: Your Honor, I've never had a
12	single conversation with them at all.
13	THE COURT: Have any of your other
14	counsel, any of the other 11 attorneys and four
15	firms contact them?
16	MR. TREECE: I do not know who's had
17	conversations. I honestly can't speak to that, Your
18	Honor. I do not know.
19	THE COURT: All right. Let's let her
20	respond.
21	MR. TREECE: All right. Thank you.
22	MS. NELSON: Your Honor, I will be very

1	brief. I do want to address one issue that was
2	raised by Mr. Chew in terms of the characterization
3	of what the VPA intends to address. It is broader
4	policy goals and in addition, in addition to the
5	gatekeeping role and also the importance of the
6	anti-SLAPP statute, also to set forth to the court
7	policy considerations surrounding allowing public
8	figure plaintiffs, such as Mr. Depp, to state claims
9	for defamation by implication. We have reviewed the
10	demurrer that is submitted by Ms. Heard. The
11	proposed amicus brief is not at all duplicative and
12	we'll present the broader free press policy
13	arguments set forth by the Virginia Press
14	Association, important considerations in a
15	defamation case, such as this one, because it will
16	have significant ramifications on the press moving
17	forward in the Commonwealth long after this case is
18	done.
19	THE COURT: Okay.
20	MS. NELSON: Thank you, Your Honor.
21	THE COURT: The matter as to whether the
22	court would allow an amicus brief is purely within

1	the discretion of the court. And there might be
2	occasions where I might invite and certainly would
3	welcome an amicus brief. This is not one of those
4	occasions. I find that counsel in the case are
5	highly experienced, highly efficient, highly
6	knowledgeable and that they will present the law
7	quite adequately to the court. I don't think it is
8	really the court's position, as seems to be
9	suggested in the last comments, that the court
10	should have policy goals. And I think that's what
11	you really said in your request that you do an
12	amicus, is that your clients have policy goals and
13	that the court, in ruling on this specific case,
14	should take your client's policy goals into effect,
15	as opposed to really, in this case, on what the law
16	already is in the Commonwealth and the evidence and
17	facts that I hear. So the request is denied. Thank
18	you. Thank you.
19	Are you all going the prepare an order?
20	MR. CHEW: We will, Your Honor.
21	THE COURT: I approve the extended
22	briefing that you all want. Reluctantly.

1	MR. CHEW: Thank you, Your Honor.
2	MR. TREECE: And one more thing just on
3	the hearing date, I just want to make sure that this
4	works. We proposed to do the hearing date on
5	December 20th. We know that works with opposing
6	counsel. I believe that's available on the court's
7	schedule. We'll file a praecipe. I just wanted to
8	inform the court of the parties' intent on that
9	front, Your Honor.
10	THE COURT: As long as I'm going to be
11	here, and I think I am, and I think we have court
12	that Friday, so I think that's fine. Could you get
13	the order into Mr. Balland as soon as possible on
14	those things?
15	MR. CHEW: We will, Your Honor. We can
16	scratch it outside.
17	THE COURT: Counsel, before you leave, I
18	need counsel to stick their heads in one second.
19	(Pause.)
20	THE COURT: Thank you. What I wanted to
21	mention is that I get these things all the time. I
22	get a courtesy copy of virtually everything. I

```
1
    don't need a courtesy copy of a certificate of
2
    discovery and a certificate. So exercise some
3
    discretion maybe on what you send to me as a
    courtesy copy, okay?
4
5
                 MR. CHEW: We will.
                                       I apologize.
                 (The hearing was concluded at 11:25 a.m.)
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
```

1	CERTIFICATE OF SHORTHAND REPORTER
2	I, Theresa R. Hollister, the court
3	reporter before whom the foregoing hearing was
4	taken, do hereby certify that the foregoing
5	transcript is a true and correct record of the
6	testimony given; that said testimony was taken by me
7	stenographically and thereafter reduced to
8	typewriting under my supervision; and that I am
9	neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by any
10	of the parties to this case and have no interest,
11	financial or otherwise, in its outcome.
12	
13	
14	
15	Thusa R Hallista
16	
17	Theresa R. Hollister
18	Court Reporter
19	
20	
21	
22	